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Abstract 14 
The central United States (U.S.) has a large livestock population including cattle, swine, sheep and 15 
goats. Simulation models were developed to assess the impact of livestock herd types and vaccination 16 
on Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreaks using the North American Animal Disease Spread 17 
Model.  In this study, potential FMD virus outbreaks in the central region of the U.S. were simulated to 18 
compare different vaccination strategies to a depopulation only scenario.  Based on data from the U.S. 19 
Department of Agriculture National Agricultural Statistics Service, a simulated population of 151,620 20 
livestock operations characterized by latitude and longitude, production type, and herd size was 21 
generated.  For the simulations, a single 17,000 head feedlot was selected as the initial latently infected 22 
herd in an otherwise susceptible population.  Direct and indirect contact rates between herds were 23 
based on survey data of livestock producers in Kansas and Colorado.  Control methods included ring 24 
vaccination around infected herds.  Feedlots >3,000 head were either the only production type that was 25 
vaccinated or were assigned the highest vaccination priority.  Simulated vaccination scenarios included 26 
low and high vaccine capacity, vaccination zones of 10 km or 50 km around detected infected premises, 27 
and vaccination trigger of 10 or 100 detected infected herds.  Probability of transmission following 28 
indirect contact, movement controls and contact rate parameters were considered uncertain and so were 29 
the subjects of sensitivity analysis.  All vaccination scenarios decreased number of herds depopulated 30 
but not all decreased outbreak duration.    Increased size of the vaccination zone during an outbreak 31 
decreased the length of the outbreak and number of herds destroyed. Increased size of the vaccination 32 
zone primarily resulted in vaccinating feedlots ≥3000 head across a larger area.  Increasing the 33 
vaccination capacity had a smaller impact on the outbreak and may not be feasible if vaccine 34 
production and delivery is limited. The ability to vaccinate all the production types surrounding an 35 
infected herd did not appear as beneficial as priority vaccination of feedlot production types that have 36 
high numbers of indirect contacts. Outbreak duration, number of herds depopulated and the 37 
effectiveness of vaccination were sensitive to indirect contact transmission probability and movement 38 
restrictions. The results of this study will provide information about the impacts of disease control 39 
protocols which may be useful in choosing the optimal control methods to meet the goals of rapid 40 
effective control and eradication.  41 
 42 
Introduction 43 
 44 
 Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) is a highly contagious disease that affects all cloven-hooved 45 
animals and is endemic in parts of Asia, Africa and South America.  The FMD virus can spread rapidly 46 
through susceptible livestock populations prior to the recognition  of clinical signs   (Burrows, 47 
1968;Burrows et al., 1981); consequently, early detection prior to the spread of the disease is difficult.  48 
FMD is a major constraint to international trade because countries currently free of FMD, like the 49 
United States (U.S.), take every precaution to prevent the entry of the disease.  The U.S. livestock 50 
population is naïve to FMD with the last outbreak occurring in 1929 (Graves, 1979).   51 
 The potential impact of an outbreak in the U.S. would likely be devastating.  A secure food 52 
supply is vital to the economy with U.S. farms selling $297 billion in agriculture products through 53 
market outlets in 2007 (USDA-NASS 2007).  In the U.S. the concern for FMD virus re-introduction 54 
and the potential economic impacts have risen with the increase of international travel and trade of 55 
animals and animal products.  At the same time agriculture has become more concentrated with larger 56 
capital investments (Hueston, 1993) resulting in increased risk to agricultural production and business 57 
continuity.  58 
 Because FMD is a foreign animal disease in the U.S., there are few avenues available for the 59 
study of potential impacts of and effective control strategies for the disease in the event of an 60 
introduction.  Epidemiological disease modeling is one such avenue.  In such models, various control 61 
measures, such as movement restrictions, increased biosecurity, depopulation, pre-emptive culling, and 62 
vaccination have been implemented in various combinations to evaluate the spread of simulated 63 
outbreaks (Ferguson et al., 2001; Gibbens et al., 2001; Bouma et al., 2003; Sutmoller et al., 2003; Perez 64 
et al., 2004; Pluimers, 2004; Yoon et al., 2006; Volkova et al., 2011). Depending on the size of the 65 
outbreak, timeliness of control implementation, the workforce capacity, and the available resources, the 66 
optimal control strategy may vary.  The efficacies of different control measures under different 67 
conditions can be readily compared using epidemiological modeling.   68 
 In the U.S., epidemiological disease models have been used to estimate the potential economic 69 
impacts of an outbreak.  Pendell et al. ( 2007) estimated economic losses of an outbreak confined to 70 
Kansas ranged from $43 to $706 million depending on the type of livestock herd that was initially 71 
infected.  In an economic model of the impact to the entire U.S., Paarlberg et al. ( 2002) estimated that 72 
a FMD outbreak could decrease U.S. farm income by approximately $14 billion and in 2012 it was 73 
estimated that an outbreak originating from the proposed National Bio- and Agri-Defense Facility in 74 
Kansas could exceed $100 billion in costs (NBAF, 2012).   75 
 Epidemiological disease models are dependent on accurate estimates of the frequency and 76 
distance distribution of contacts between livestock operations to estimate disease spread and impact, 77 
and to guide control measures (Gibbens et al., 2001; Woolhouse and Donaldson, 2001; Dickey et al., 78 
2008; Premashthira et al., 2011).  Previous studies that have modeled FMD outbreaks in the central 79 
U.S. have relied on expert opinion or contact rates adapted from other regions (Pendell et al., 2007; 80 
Greathouse, 2010; Premashthira, 2012).  In order to improve the validity of models of this region of the 81 
U.S., we used the results of a recent survey of livestock producers (McReynolds et al., 2014a) to inform 82 
model parameters used in the current study.  83 
 The primary objective of this study was to model FMD outbreaks in the Central U.S., using the 84 
best available information to establish rates of contact among herds in this region, to identify optimal 85 
vaccination control strategies based on their effectiveness in minimizing simulated outbreak durations 86 
and numbers of herds depopulated.  A secondary objective was to analyze the sensitivity of the model 87 
to specific input parameters,including movement controls, direct contact rate, indirect contact rate, and 88 
probability of indirect transmission. 89 
 90 
Materials and Methods 91 
 92 
Study Population 93 
 94 
 The number of herds, type of herds and herd sizes at the county level were generated from the 95 
U.S. agricultural census 2007 NASS data (NASS, 2007) and adjusted according to criteria by Melius et 96 
al. (2006).  The study area included Wyoming, South Dakota, Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas, the 97 
northern region of New Mexico and Oklahoma, and the Texas Panhandle (Fig. 1).  There were 151,620 98 
livestock herds in the study area in 2007 (USDA, 2007) including 86,655 cow/calf, 3,232 dairy, 979 99 
large feedlots (>3,000 head), 25,096 small feedlots (<3,000 head), 1,071 large swine (>1,000 head), 100 
6,463 small swine (<1,000 head), 5,159 beef and swine, and 22,965 small ruminant herds (Table 1).  101 
NASS data do not account for mixed production types such as beef-swine yet data suggest 102 
approximately 7% of Kansas and Colorado herds report having both beef cattle and swine 103 
(McReynolds et al., 2014a)  To account for this production type seven percent of beef and swine 104 
operations were randomly re-designated in the NASS data set from the population of cow/calf 105 
operations and small swine in Kansas, Nebraska, Eastern Colorado, and Oklahoma (McReynolds et al., 106 
2014a).  The total population was 39,413,228 animals in all production types (Table 1).  Heterogeneous 107 
random locations within counties were generated for herds using a weighting scheme based on altitude, 108 
flatness, and human population developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for USDA 109 
(Hullinger et al., 2009).  This method assures that number of herds, number of animals in each herd and 110 
production types match at the county level (herds are always allocated to the county they reside in 111 
based on NASS data).  The geo-located population data set was provided to the authors by USDA.   112 
 113 
Simulation model 114 
 115 
 The North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM), an open source ) herd-based 116 
spatial stochastic epidemic simulation model (Harvey and Reeves, 2010; Harvey et al., 2007) was used 117 
to model FMD eradication strategies.  Scenarios were simulated for various FMD vaccination 118 
protocols, and were compared to a scenario that made use of only depopulation of detected infected 119 
herds and traced forward direct contacts of infected herds (Scenario 1).  Modeled scenarios are listed in 120 
Table 2 and include variations in vaccine capacity, vaccination zone diameter, and the number of 121 
infected herds before a vaccination program is initiated.  Simulated vaccination protocols included low 122 
and high vaccine capacity, which were defined based on results from a Kansas and Colorado livestock 123 
producer survey (McReynolds et al., 2014a).  The livestock survey asked producers to report the time it 124 
would take to vaccinate, tag, and keep records for their entire herd.  Vaccination was carried out either 125 
for large feedlots only (low vaccine capacity 1 herd per day by day 22 and 3 herds per day by day 40 126 
and high vaccine capacity 8 herds per day by day 22 and 15 herds per day by day 40) or for all herd 127 
types (low vaccine capacity 5 herds per day by day 22 and 10 herds per day by day 40 and high vaccine 128 
capacity 50 herds per day by day 22 and 80 herds per day by day 40).  When vaccination capacity was 129 
limiting, herds were vaccinated according to a priority scheme based on production type.  Vaccination 130 
priority from highest to lowest for scenarios where all herd types could be vaccinated was: large feedlot 131 
(≥3,000 head), small feedlot (<3,000 head), large swine (≥1,000 head), small swine (<1,000 head), 132 
beef-swine, dairy, cow-calf, and small ruminant.  Feedlots are prioritized for vaccination because the 133 
large number of cattle on a premises makes it difficult to depopulate all of the cattle in a timely fashion 134 
and because they are terminal animals that fit a vaccinate to slaughter strategy thus conserving 135 
destruction capacity and production value.  The low vaccine capacity was to simulate administration by 136 
USDA personnel and the high capacity producer administration of vaccine.  The vaccinated animals 137 
remain in the population unless infected after their immune period ends.   138 
 The distributions for within herd prevalence of FMDV for NAADSM were produced using a 139 
within herd prevalence model (WH) (Reeves, 2012a) based on estimates for the latent, subclinical 140 
infectious, and clinical infectious stages.  The WH model operates at the level of the individual animal, 141 
and incorporates sources of individual-level variation such as variability in the durations of incubating 142 
and infectious periods, the stochastic nature of the disease spread among individuals, the effects of 143 
vaccination, and disease mortality (Reeves, 2012b).  Distributions of the clinical stages of FMD in 144 
individual animals were based on a meta-analysis of the duration of the disease states where the 145 
infectious period was reported including the subclinical and clinical periods (Mardones et al., 2010).  146 
The reported clinical period in Mardones et al., (2010) is the time when clinical signs are apparent 147 
which includes a period when the animal is no longer infectious.  The WH model requires durations for 148 
the latent, subclinical infectious and clinical infectious stages.  Distributions for the latent and 149 
subclinical states were used directly as they are reported in Mardones et al. (2010) but the reported 150 
distributions were not suitable for the clinical infectious period in WH and required adjustment for the 151 
period when the animal is not infectious.  As reported in figure 1of Mardones et al. (2010) the  152 
Subclinical period + Clinical period = Infectious period  153 
therefore 154 
Infectious period - Subclinical period = Clinical period 155 
The clinical infectious period distribution for cattle, swine and small ruminants was calculated for WH 156 
by using monte-carlo simulation (@Risk 5.01, Palisade Corp., Ithaca, NY, USA) to sample 10,000 157 
values from the subclinical infectious period and the infectious period reported in Mardones et al. 158 
(2010).  When the sampled value from the infectious period was greater than the sampled value for the 159 
subclinical period, the value for the subclinical period was subtracted from the sampled values for the 160 
infectious period.  The resulting distribution of values was fit to a theoretical distribution (@Risk 5.0.1) 161 
to estimate the clinical infectious period for use in WH to estimate the within herd prevalence over time 162 
for each production type.  The probability of infection following a direct contact in NAADSM was 163 
based on within-herd prevalence of the infected herd as a function of time since infection.   164 
Model parameters were set to allow virus to spread by direct contact, indirect contact, and 165 
airborne/local spread.  In NAADSM a direct contact represents the movement of infected livestock 166 
between premises.  An indirect contact represents the movement of a fomite such as contaminated 167 
vehicle, equipment, clothing, or a person between premises. Direct and indirect contacts between 168 
livestock production types were based on a livestock contact survey in the central U.S. (McReynolds et 169 
al., 2014a) (Appendix Tables A1 and A2).  The direct contact rate was calculated from the reported 170 
count of contacts between specific production types to provide an overall production type specific 171 
number of contacts per day.  Destination to source combinations for indirect contact were calculated 172 
based on the total number of indirect contacts reported for each production type, multiplied by the 173 
proportion of all indirect contact made to the respective production type to produce the number of daily 174 
indirect contacts between each destination to source combination.  For example if cow-calf operations 175 
received 0.7 total visits from potential indirect contacts per day, and 18.8% of all potential indirect contacts 176 
(across all production types) were to Cow-Calf operations then in 0.133 visits per day the previous production 177 
type exposure of the indirect contact was a Cow-Calf operation resulting in an indirect contact between two 178 
Cow-Calf operations (0.7*18.8% =  0.133 contacts per day as shown in Table 2A).  The daily indirect contact 179 
rate between each production type was adjusted based on the assumption that not all production types 180 
are equally connected (e.g. beef operations are more connected with each other than with swine 181 
operations).  The daily mean number of direct and indirect contacts between production types were 182 
used to parameterize the model.  Generation of actual direct and indirect contacts between production 183 
types in the NAADSM model were stochastically generated for each infected herd each day from a 184 
Poisson distribution with lambda equal to the calculated mean contact rate (direct and indirect) for that 185 
production type combination (Tables A1 and A2).  Specific susceptible recipient herds of direct or 186 
indirect contacts were selected based on a random draw from the respective distance distribution for 187 
contacts between specific production types (Tables A1 and A3).  The probability of airborne/local 188 
spread at 1 km was 0.5% per day and declined linearly to 0% at the maximum distance of spread of 3 189 
km.  The probability of local/airborne transmission was calculated based on distance between the 190 
infected and susceptible herd, herd size and within herd prevalence.  Actual transmission between the 191 
infectious and susceptible herd was generated based on generation of a random number r between 0 192 
and 1 where infection is transmitted when r is less than the calculated probability of transmission. 193 
 Days to first disease detection was a generated output by the NAADSM model based on the 194 
probability of disease recognition within infected herds as a function of the amount of time the herd has 195 
been clinical infectious.  Actual detection of a clinical herd (both the initial and subsequent herds) was 196 
based on generation of a random number r between 0 and 1 where the infected herd is detected when 197 
when r is less than the calculated probability of recognition.  The probability of recognition increased 198 
over time within a herd peaking at 100% by day 10 in all herd types except small ruminants where 199 
recognition probability did not reach 100% until day 14 following introduction of disease to that herd.  200 
For all scenarios,  201 
a) All herds detected positive and the forward traced direct contacts of detected herds were 202 
depopulated. 203 
b) The probability of indirect disease transmission following indirect contact between an 204 
infected and susceptible herd was held fixed at 20% for all production types except swine 205 
which was set at 30% to account for increased FMD virus shedding by swine based on 206 
subject matter expert opinion solicited by USDA.  207 
c) Direct contact through animal movement was linearly reduced to 10% of pre-outbreak 208 
levels and indirect contacts were linearly reduced to 30% of pre-outbreak levels by day 7 209 
after the first disease detection to allow for time delays in implementation and enforcement 210 
of movement controls based on subject matter expert opinion solicited by USDA.  211 
d) Depopulation capacity was linearly increased from 0 to 8 herds/day by day 10 and 16 212 
herds/day by day 30 after first disease detection.   213 
e) A 100% effective quarantine of infected premises and a ban on livestock movement from 214 
known infected premises was assumed.   215 
Depopulation was set to begin on day 2 after first disease detection of the outbreak.    All scenarios 216 
were run for 200 iterations.  The mean, 5th and 95th percentiles of outbreak duration, number of 217 
destroyed herds and number of animals vaccinated were monitored for convergence. The end of the 218 
active disease phase (i.e., the point in time at which no infected herds remained in the population) was 219 
the endpoint for all scenarios.  Conditions of the NAADSM model used in this study of a hypothetical 220 
outbreak in the central U.S.were: 221 
a) There are eight defined livestock operation production types in the study region (Table 1) 222 
and wildlife are not included. 223 
b) All herds in the same production type have the same disease parameters.  Probability density 224 
functions characterize the length of the disease periods and this length is determined 225 
stochastically by a random draw from the distributions for each new infected herd. 226 
c) The population is closed and constant.  Herds only exit the population by depopulation. 227 
d) There is no mortality from FMD during the simulated outbreak. 228 
e) There are no virus carrier states for recovered animals. 229 
f) Vaccine is 100% effective following a 7 day delay after vaccination. 230 
g) Quarantine of infected herds is 100% effective for all contacts and implemented until the 231 
herd is depopulated. 232 
h) Detection of positive herds was based on the probability of visual, clinical disease 233 
recognition within infected herds as a function of time the herd has been clinical infectious.  234 
 235 
Experimental design 236 
 237 
 In all scenarios, a single 17,000 head feedlot in Northeast Colorado was latently infected and 238 
served as the index herd for the outbreak.  Seventeen different disease mitigation scenarios were 239 
simulated as described in Table 2.   240 
 241 
Sensitivity Analysis 242 
 243 
 Values of selected uncertain parameters were varied from baseline values in a sensitivity 244 
analysis to assess their independent influence on the disease modeling results.  The 17 scenarios were 245 
simulated for each variable change.  The baseline probability of transmission given indirect contact was 246 
20% and the sensitivity analysis assessed it at 15% and 25%.  Sensitivity analysis of the contact rates 247 
were also completed with the direct contact rates adjusted to +/- 20% and +/-50% of the baseline rate 248 
parameter.  Sensitivity of the indirect contact rates for each production type combination was assessed 249 
by changing all production type combination rates by +/- 20% from the calculated parameter for all 250 
scenarios.  Lastly the influence of indirect movement controls was assessed by changing the baseline 251 
indirect movement control of 30% of pre-outbreak levels to 20% and 40% of pre-outbreak movement 252 
levels to represent a relatively wide range of indirect movement control. 253 
 254 
Data analysis 255 
 256 
 The NAADSM model produced results for each day of the outbreak for each iteration.  The 257 
results from each scenario were aggregated into weekly outcome counts for each iteration of each 258 
scenario.  Summary statistics were generated for each of the scenarios.  Outbreak duration was 259 
calculated from the first day of the simulation to the end of the active disease phase of the outbreak.  260 
Analysis was performed in commercially available software (Stata12.1, (StataCorp., 2011) and in open 261 
source 64 bit R 2.15.2 (R development core team, 2011).  To test the statistical differences between 262 
scenarios, a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance was used to identify significant differences in 263 
outbreak duration and number of herds depopulated controlling for multiple comparisons at p<0.05 264 
according to the method of Holm (1979) implemented in R.   265 
 266 
Results 267 
 268 
 The mean, 5th and 95th percentiles of outbreak duration, number of destroyed herds and 269 
number of animals showed less than 4% change at 200 iterations for all scenarios. Most scenarios 270 
converged at approximately 100 iterations and all scenarios converged before 200 iterations.  In all 271 
scenarios the main source of new infections was indirect contacts; approximately 95% of infected herds 272 
resulted from an indirect contact and the remaining 5% were infected from direct contact or 273 
airborne/local-area spread.  In all scenarios the median first day of detection was at 10 or 11 days.  The 274 
median day of first vaccination was 17-22 days following first detection for scenarios where 275 
vaccination was initiated after 10 herds were detected positive.  For scenarios where vaccination was 276 
initiated after 100 herds were detected the median day of first vaccination was 57-65 days after the first 277 
detection.   278 
For scenario 1 with no vaccination, there was a sharp peak in the weekly number of detected herds 279 
compared to the scenarios with vaccination (Figure 2).  In scenario 1 there were 104 new herds 280 
detected during week 18 and during week 28, 342 herds were detected.  By comparison, in scenario 2, 281 
which used a small vaccine capacity and small vaccination zone, 74 new herds were detected during 282 
week 18 and 60 herds were newly detected during week 28.  The total median number of herds 283 
detected as clinically infected per outbreak in scenario 1 was 10,139, which represented approximately 284 
6.5% of the herds in the region.  All vaccination scenarios had fewer detected clinical herds: for 285 
example, scenario 2 had a median of 2,183 clinically infected herds per outbreak, and scenario 4 had a 286 
median of 419 clinically infected herds per outbreak. 287 
 288 
Outbreak Duration 289 
 The model outcomes are reported in Table 3.  The scenarios with vaccination zones of 50 km 290 
(scenarios 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, and 17), had a shorter median and 90
th
 percentile durations compared to 291 
the scenarios with 10 km vaccination zones (scenarios 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, and 15): the best eight 292 
ranked scenarios for shortest median duration all had 50 km vaccination zones (Table 3).  Scenario 16 293 
had the shortest median outbreak duration, followed by scenarios 4, 8, 12, and 17.  The vaccination 294 
capacity and the number of herds infected prior to starting vaccination had less impact on median 295 
outbreak duration than the size of the vaccination zones: scenarios with both high and low vaccination 296 
capacity and number of herds infected to initiate vaccination were among the top ranked scenarios.  297 
Scenario 1 ranked 10
th
 in median outbreak duration.  Scenarios 7, 10, and 2 had the three longest 298 
median outbreak durations and all had vaccination zones of 10 km.  Additionally, scenarios 7 and 10 299 
had a late vaccination trigger of 100 herds infected prior to the initiation of vaccination. 300 
 301 
 302 
Depopulation  303 
 All vaccination scenarios decreased the median number of herds depopulated compared to 304 
scenario 1.  The 7 scenarios with the lowest median number of depopulated herds all had a vaccination 305 
zone radius of 50 km, ranging from median numbers of depopulated herds from 252 to 1,735.  Scenario 306 
1 had a median of 6,890 herds depopulated per simulated outbreak.  The distribution was heavily 307 
skewed toward larger numbers depopulated (Table 3).  In scenario 1, the median number of herds 308 
depopulated included all large feedlot and dairy herds in the population.  Also, scenario 1 was the only 309 
scenario with herds waiting to be depopulated at the end of the active disease phase (median 2,830 310 
herds waiting per simulated outbreak, data not shown).  Scenario 16 depopulated the fewest number of 311 
herds followed by scenarios 4, 8, and 17 which did not significantly differ from one another.   312 
 313 
Vaccination  314 
 In the best 8 scenarios in terms of vaccinating the smallest median number of herds, only large 315 
feedlots were vaccinated.  None of these scenarios were among the best scenarios in terms of median 316 
outbreak duration or median number of herds depopulated.  Scenario 11 vaccinated the fewest number 317 
of herds followed by scenarios 3 and 7, which did not differ significantly from each other (Table 3).    318 
The only scenarios in which all production types were vaccinated were scenarios 6 and 14, which had a 319 
high vaccine capacity and a small zone size.  Due to vaccine capacity in the remaining scenarios, only 320 
large and small feedlots were vaccinated.  The number of herds vaccinated differed greatly between the 321 
scenarios.  Scenarios 16 and 8 had a high vaccine capacity with large feedlots having first priority and 322 
vaccinated approximately 10,000 herds, compared to scenarios 4 and 12, which had a low vaccine 323 
capacity and vaccinated approximately 1,800 herds. However, in scenario 17 only large feedlots were 324 
vaccinated resulting in 1,329 herds vaccinated and the number of herds depopulated was similar to 325 
scenarios 4, 8 and 12.   326 
 In scenarios with large feedlot vaccination priority, a large vaccination zone and high vaccine 327 
capacity (scenarios 8 and 16) there was a sharp peak at the beginning of the outbreak in the number of 328 
animals vaccinated but it dropped off sooner than the scenarios with a small zone and high capacity 329 
(scenarios 6 and 14) (Figure 3).  The median of the maximum number of animals vaccinated in a 1 330 
week period ranged from 163,124 to 963,427, and the maximum 90
th
 percentile ranged from 251,883 to 331 
2.5 million animals in one week depending on vaccine capacity and zone size.   332 
 333 
Sensitivity analysis 334 
 When the probability of transmission following indirect contact was increased to 25% and 335 
decreased to 15%, it was influential in determining the duration of the outbreak, the number of herds 336 
depopulated, and the numbers of herds and animals vaccinated.   Vaccination was less beneficial in 337 
mitigating the effects of an outbreak when probability of transmission following indirect contact was 338 
decreased to 15%.  In all such scenarios, the median duration of the outbreak was approximately 100 339 
days (range 93-150) (Figure 4) and the median number of herds depopulated was approximately 50 340 
(range 36-83) (Figure 5).  The number of herds depopulated decreased by over 90% in most scenarios 341 
(range 82-99%) when the probability of indirect transmission was 15%, and increased by over 200% in 342 
all but scenario 1 when the probability of indirect transmission was 25% (range 218-1381%).  When 343 
the probability of indirect transmission was 25% the median duration of the outbreak was over 500 344 
days for most scenarios (range 418-792) (Figure 4), and the median number of herds depopulated was 345 
over 5000 for all scenarios except 8, 16 and 17 (Figure 5).  In scenarios with vaccination zones of 50 346 
km, when the probability of indirect transmission was increased to 25%, the median duration of the 347 
outbreak increased by over 100% compared to an increase of less than 5% in the scenarios with 348 
vaccination zones of 10 km.  All scenarios with a vaccination zone of 50 km except scenario 12 still 349 
had shorter duration and fewer herds depopulated compared to scenarios with a 10 km vaccination 350 
zone.   351 
Changes in the effectiveness of indirect contact movement controls were also influential within 352 
the range examined in determining the outbreak duration, the number of herds depopulated and 353 
vaccinated (Figures 7, 8, 9).  When indirect movement controls were increased to achieve 20% of pre-354 
outbreak levels (as opposed to 30% in the baseline scenarios), the median duration of all scenarios was 355 
approximately 100 days (range 85-120) (Figure 7).  The median numbers of herds depopulated 356 
decreased 65-95% to approximately 50 herds (range 39-66) in all scenarios (Figure 8).  When indirect 357 
movement controls were set at 40% of pre-outbreak levels, median duration of the outbreak was 358 
approximately 500 days for all scenarios (range 481-726) (Figure 7), and the median number of herds 359 
depopulated increased over 200% for all but scenario 1 to over 5000 for all scenarios except 8 and 16 360 
(Figure 8). 361 
Changes in the indirect contact rates between herds were influential in the number of herds 362 
depopulated, but less so on outbreak duration.  When indirect contact rates were decreased by 20% the 363 
10
th
 percentile of outbreak duration was decreased approximately 25-72% and the median by 33-72% 364 
(Figure 10).  Median number of herds depopulated decreased 65-97% to 58 to 584 herds (Figure 11).  365 
When indirect contact rates were increased by 20% the median number of herds depopulated increased 366 
60-89% to greater than 5,000 herds for all scenarios except 4, 8, 16 and 17.   367 
Sensitivity analysis scenarios ranked similarly to the baseline with scenario 16 or 17 always 368 
having the fewest median number of herds depopulated for all sensitivity scenarios.   Scenarios 8 and 4 369 
were also among the best ranking scenarios for the lowest median number of herds depopulated. 370 
Scenario 1 was ranked in the best 5 scenarios for number of herds depopulated when movement 371 
controls were either 20% or 40% of pre-outbreak indirect contact levels or when the indirect contact 372 
rate was increased by 20% (Table 4).  The sensitivity analysis scenario rankings for outbreak duration 373 
showed more variation from the baseline and among the sensitivity scenarios.  Scenario 4 was always 374 
among the best five scenarios for outbreak duration and scenario 16 was among the best five in all 375 
sensitivity scenarios except when indirect movement control was 40% of pre-outbreak indirect contact 376 
levels.  Scenario 1 was ranked best for outbreak duration when indirect movement control was 40% of 377 
pre-outbreak indirect contact levels and among the best five scenarios for outbreak duration when 378 
indirect transmission probability was 25% and when the indirect contact rate was increased by 20% 379 
(Table 4).   380 
Increasing direct contact rate by 20% or 50% had little impact of the outcome of the results 381 
(data not shown). 382 
 383 
Discussion 384 
General discussion 385 
 Modeling is a widely used method for assessing the impact of an FMDV introduction in the 386 
U.S. and the effectiveness of control because of its nature as a highly infective foreign animal disease.  387 
Control methods in the face of an outbreak of FMD include movement controls on livestock and 388 
support industries, increased biosecurity such as disinfection of traffic on and off the farm, slaughter of 389 
affected and in contact or high risk animals, and vaccination.  In this study probability of indirect 390 
transmission, movement controls, and vaccination protocols were analyzed to determine the impact of 391 
the different control methods.  We interpret probability of indirect transmission as a surrogate for 392 
disinfectant or biosecurity practices on farm in the sensitivity analysis.  393 
The number of herds depopulated was greatest for scenario 1 and the least for scenario 16 394 
(Table 3).  In scenario 1, the number of herds depopulated was much higher than the scenarios that 395 
included vaccination.  The outbreak in scenario 1 spread rapidly and it was the only scenario with herds 396 
waiting to be depopulated at the end of the active disease phase, having exceeded the depopulation 397 
capacity.  Scenario 16, which had a large vaccination capacity as well as a large vaccination zone, was 398 
able to contain the spread.  Due to workforce and vaccine capacity, the high capacity vaccination in a 399 
large zone might not be feasible during an outbreak.  In the scenarios with a larger vaccination zone, 400 
vaccination was advantageous in controlling depopulation and duration suggesting a threshold level of 401 
vaccination necessary to bring the outbreak under rapid control.  The results reported here represent 402 
onset of immunity at 7 days after vaccination and a predominantly indirect contact infection challenge.  403 
These results support the value of vaccination strategies, particularly those with large vaccination 404 
zones, to control disease impact.  The model assumed 100% vaccine efficacy so this is clearly an upper 405 
bound of the potential vaccine effect.  NAADSM does not currently allow for variation in vaccine 406 
efficacy and further studies examining the effect of vaccine are warranted.  High potency vaccines 407 
formulated for emergency vaccination have shown 100% efficacy by 2-4 days after vaccination in 408 
small studies of cattle and pigs challenged by indirect aerosols (Cox and Burnett, 2009).  Efficacy was 409 
only 70-75% at 10 days after vaccination when a direct exposure to shedding animals was used as the 410 
challenge (Cox and Burnett, 2009).   411 
Scenarios 7, 10, and 2 (each of which had small vaccination zone and low vaccination capacity) 412 
had a longer duration of outbreak when compared to scenario 1 (only depopulation).  The duration of 413 
the outbreak may potentially be shorter in scenario 1 due to rapid expansion and burnout without 414 
vaccination to slow the spread of the virus.  Limited vaccination programs may reduce the number of 415 
infections without effectively bringing the outbreak to an end.  Perez et al. (2004) concluded from the 416 
Argentina outbreak in 2001 that mass vaccination can be useful in controlling a large epidemic but that 417 
it could take a long time to bring the outbreak under control (Perez et al., 2004).  The number of herds 418 
depopulated in the results reported here however, was decreased in all vaccination scenarios including 419 
scenarios 2, 7 and 10.  Based on number of herds depopulated, scenario 2, 7, and 10 control methods 420 
are advantageous compared to scenario 1 despite the longer duration of outbreak.  An economic 421 
analysis of a subset of these scenarios however indicated that outbreak duration was a major 422 
determinant in increasing outbreak cost (Schroeder et al. accepted). 423 
  Despite the large region represented in the model, in reality not all movements would be 424 
confined to the modeled area as in this hypothetical FMD outbreak, so a real outbreak could spread 425 
further.  The duration of a hypothetical epidemic modeled in the Texas Panhandle region had a median 426 
of 25-52 days (Ward et al., 2009) which was much shorter than the results in the study reported here 427 
where median duration ranged from 181-608 days.  Ward et al. (2009) was confined to an eight county 428 
region and the outbreak could easily be larger following spread to other regions.  We chose an initially 429 
latent herd in the central location of our population to allow the most geographic freedom of disease 430 
spread and minimize any geographic boundary effect in the results.   431 
 The median number of herds detected as clinically infected for scenario 1 represented 432 
approximately 6.5% (10,139 /151,620) of the herds in the study population and scenario 2 represented 433 
1.4% (2,183/151,620) of the herds.  The results of scenario 2 are comparable to the 2001 U.K. FMD 434 
outbreak where 1.4% of herds (2030/146,000) were reported as infected (Anderson, 2002) and an FMD 435 
model of 3 counties in California where 2% of herds were infected (Bates et al., 2003b).  In the study 436 
reported here, scenario 16 had the lowest number of infected herds detected at 0.16% followed by 437 
scenario 4 at 0.3% of the herds detected as clinically infected.     438 
 Our data is consistent with a large vaccination zone having the biggest impact on the duration of 439 
the outbreak.  Bates et al. (2003b) found that vaccinating all herds within 50 km of an infected herd 440 
was an effective strategy to reduce duration of the outbreak when modeling an FMD outbreak in a 3-441 
county region of California.  In that regional study the outbreaks in scenarios with the large vaccination 442 
zone lasted the shortest number of days despite not all the herds in the zone getting vaccinated due to 443 
capacity limitations.    444 
 Our low vaccination capacity scenarios were meant to represent vaccine administration by 445 
USDA personnel only.  Livestock production type had priority over days waiting in queue for 446 
vaccination so the only scenarios where any production type besides feedlots were vaccinated were 447 
scenarios that had a high vaccination capacity and a small vaccination zone.  However, these small 448 
zone and high capacity scenarios had outbreaks that lasted longer, leading to more herds being 449 
vaccinated compared to high capacity and large zone scenarios.  The two scenarios that had the highest 450 
number of herds vaccinated (scenarios 14 and 6) had high vaccination capacity, a small zone, 451 
vaccinated all herd types and exceeded 30,000 herds vaccinated.  However, they were never among the 452 
top ranked scenarios for outbreak duration or number of herds depopulated.  Because of the high 453 
percent of infections resulting from indirect contacts in these models, the ability to vaccinate all the 454 
production types surrounding an infected herd did not appear as beneficial as priority vaccination of 455 
feedlot production type that have high numbers of indirect contacts.   456 
 The high vaccine capacity scenarios were meant to represent vaccination being carried out by 457 
the farmers and ranchers as was done in the 2001 Uruguay outbreak.  Data from the Uruguay outbreak 458 
indicates an average vaccination rate of 350,000 cattle per day in each round of vaccination (Sutmoller 459 
et al., 2003) which is a higher rate than the requirement in our high vaccine capacity scenarios where 460 
the median of the maximum animals vaccinated in a 1 week period was 963,427, and similar to the 90
th
 461 
percentile (2.5 million animals in one week).  In the U.S., animal health officials could have some 462 
concerns regarding producers administering FMD vaccine themselves, as it is a restricted and 463 
controlled vaccine.  While reliable procedures for administering vaccine and identifying vaccinates 464 
would be necessary, allowing producers and private veterinarians to perform vaccination would 465 
increase the capacity dramatically.  466 
 Minimizing the number of herds vaccinated is not the most appropriate measure of the best 467 
vaccination strategy, but is useful for identifying the most efficient use of vaccination.  The scenarios 468 
with the shortest duration of outbreak and the lowest number of herds depopulated varied in the number 469 
of herds vaccinated, but were consistently scenarios with large vaccination zones.    470 
 The top five ranking scenarios for outbreak duration and number of depopulated herds 471 
contained scenarios with both 10 and 100 herds infected prior to the initiation of vaccination suggesting 472 
the decision to vaccinate may not need to be made at the very beginning of the outbreak allowing 473 
additional time to produce adequate vaccine supplies to meet demand and to evaluate the need for 474 
vaccination.  These results also suggest that a proper vaccination plan could decrease the number of 475 
personnel needed for depopulation to partly make up the likely increased personnel requirements to 476 
implement vaccination.  Vaccination zone size was the most important factor determining the outbreak 477 
duration and the number of herds depopulated.  All five top ranked scenarios for the duration of the 478 
outbreak and number of herds depopulated had large vaccination zones.  Vaccination does not require 479 
the time or the quantity of labor that are needed for depopulation and disposal of carcasses.  The 480 
disadvantages of vaccination are imperfect efficacy, the delay before protection of almost a week (Salt 481 
et al., 1998), the challenge of producing sufficient quantities of strain specific vaccine, the lack of cross 482 
immunity between strains, and the trade implications of vaccinating and recovering disease free status 483 
(Office International des Epizooties/World Organisation for Animal Health, 2013).   484 
Some previous research has found that vaccination protocols in the control of a FMD outbreak were not 485 
economically beneficial (Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003; Elbakidze et al., 2009).  Bates et al. (2003) in 486 
a benefit-cost analysis model of a FMD outbreak in 3 counties in California, found vaccination would 487 
be a cost-effective strategy if vaccinated animals were not subsequently depopulated (Bates et al., 488 
2003a).  Vaccinated herds in the scenarios reported here were not depopulated and all vaccination 489 
scenarios in this study did decrease the number of herds depopulated compared to depopulation only.  490 
Further, an economic analysis of these results found that vaccination was also advantageous to 491 
decreasing the median economic impact of the outbreak (Schroeder et al., accepted).   492 
FMD simulation models have found that targeting high-risk production types can increase the 493 
efficiency of vaccination (Keeling et al., 2003).  In the current study large feedlots were prioritized for 494 
vaccination due to their high contact rate and the large number of feedlots in the central region of the 495 
U.S.   Large feedlots have a high number of indirect contacts (McReynolds et al., 2014a) potentially 496 
increasing their risk of becoming infected and spreading infection during an outbreak.  In this study, the 497 
scenarios with large vaccine zones and feedlot vaccination priority, predominantly vaccinated large and 498 
small feedlots but had a similar impact on the outbreak as scenarios where only large feedlots were 499 
vaccinated.  Scenario 17 is of note as a top ranking large feedlot only vaccination scenario with high 500 
capacity (8 herds by 22 days and 15 herds by 40 days) and large vaccination zone.  This suggests there 501 
may be methods to efficiently apply vaccination to high risk groups and efficiently use resources 502 
(Keeling et al., 2003; Keeling and Shattock, 2012).  Animals in large feedlots are also a natural 503 
vaccinate to die (slaughter) population perhaps facilitating restoration of FMD free without vaccination 504 
status, without the cost of depopulation or the loss of valuable protein for human nutrition.  However, 505 
vaccinating to live versus to die has different implications from an international trade perspective.  In 506 
vaccinate to live scenarios, export market access would likely be delayed at least 3 additional months 507 
relative to a depopulating all vaccinated animals.   508 
  509 
Sensitivity of input values 510 
  The operational validity of the model was assessed using a sensitivity analysis to determine the 511 
impact of uncertainty in contact and control methodologies (Frey and Patil, 2002; Garner and 512 
Hamilton, 2011).  Indirect contacts are a potential risk for disease spread particularly for a highly 513 
contagious disease such as FMD (Cottral, 1969; Ellis-Iversen et al., 2011) and in our scenarios 514 
approximately 95% of the infections were transmitted through indirect contacts.  The sensitivity 515 
analysis was used to determine the impact of changes in the disease control methods and the contact 516 
rates on the model results.  The sensitivity analysis of the direct contact rate demonstrated that the 517 
model was not sensitive to changes in the direct contact rate, which may be due in part to the 100% 518 
quarantine of infected herds within the model.  The model was sensitive to changes in the indirect 519 
contact rate.  This highlights the need for accurate data regarding indirect contacts between livestock 520 
producers.  Indirect contact rates used here are based on a survey of producers in Kansas and Colorado 521 
(McReynolds et al., 2014a) representing all modeled production types and provide the best available 522 
estimates of direct and indirect contacts between production types for the region being simulated.  523 
When the indirect contact rates for all production types were decreased by 20%, the median duration of 524 
the outbreak and number of herds depopulated decreased substantially.  The ranking of the best 525 
scenarios by number of herds depopulated remained similar (Table 8) but the impact of vaccination was 526 
substantially decreased.  527 
 When the indirect contact rates increased 20%, scenarios with a small vaccination zone had 528 
larger outbreaks than scenario 1.  Again scenario 1 did appear to spread quickly with the number of 529 
herds exposed to the virus and waiting for depopulation being the largest of all the scenarios.  When the 530 
indirect contact rate was increased the number of infected herds increased rapidly and the vaccination 531 
capacities modeled were not sufficient to control the outbreak.  In the face of an outbreak that is 532 
spreading rapidly vaccine capacity appears to be important.  In the Taiwan outbreak inadequate vaccine 533 
supply was one of the potential factors in the large epidemic (Yang et al., 1999).  This may also be a 534 
factor in our scenarios where the vaccination zone was small and the outbreak lasted longer than the 535 
depopulation alone scenario.   536 
 Due to the impact of movement controls on an agriculture community and on animal welfare, a 537 
sensitivity analysis on the impact of movement controls within the model was simulated.  Feed 538 
delivery, supplies, and labor are indirect movements that must be maintained for business continuity 539 
and for animal welfare reasons in the face of a FMD outbreak.  The minimum amount of movements 540 
that will be necessary will vary for different production types.  Decreasing indirect movement from 541 
30% to 20% of pre-outbreak levels substantially decreased the number of herds depopulated and the 542 
duration of the outbreaks to similar levels in all scenarios.  None of the vaccination scenarios were 543 
different from scenario 1 for number of herds depopulated and duration of outbreak.  While decreasing 544 
movement was effective in decreasing the number of herds depopulated, the ability to achieve a 545 
decrease in indirect movement to 20% of the pre-outbreak  level without animal welfare issues is not 546 
clear.  The animal welfare consequence of these movement controls on un-infected or infected herds 547 
awaiting depopulation has been found to be significant (Laurence, 2002).  If this level of movement 548 
control is achievable in the face of an outbreak consistent with acceptable animal welfare, it may be 549 
sufficient and vaccination may have little additional benefit.  When indirect movement control was set 550 
at 40% of pre-outbreak levels, the duration of the outbreaks were all similar to scenario 1, lasting 500 551 
to 700 days and scenario 1 had the third lowest number of herds depopulated.  This demonstrates that if 552 
strict indirect movement controls are not possible, vaccination might not be effective in disease 553 
outbreak control.  Because the range of estimates of indirect movement control (20% to 40% of pre-554 
outbreak levels) used in the sensitivity analysis identified substantial variation in the outcomes, 555 
additional estimates outside that range were not evaluated.  Achievable movement controls consistent 556 
with acceptable animal welfare require additional investigation to support more refined modeling.   557 
 Probability of transmission given an indirect contact showed a similar effect in the sensitivity 558 
analysis.  When the probability of indirect transmission was decreased from 20% to 15% the number of 559 
herds depopulated and the outbreak duration decreased substantially in all scenarios.  The probability 560 
of transmission following indirect contact between an infected and susceptible herd could represent a 561 
measure of the biosecurity practices applied to traffic and people on and off the farm.  Important 562 
aspects include truck washing, boot washing and control of visitor contact with animals.  With 563 
increased biosecurity, vaccination did not offer any benefit over the depopulation alone control strategy 564 
but again the impact and ability to achieve this level of biosecurity is unknown.  Increased biosecurity 565 
would be an important aspect of control efforts and could be a welfare friendly option to control spread 566 
compared to increased movement controls.  Alternately, decreased probability of transmission 567 
following indirect contact may be representative of FMD strains with lower transmissibility.  When the 568 
probability of transmission given an indirect contact was increased from 20% to 25% the number of 569 
herds depopulated was substantially increased and the impact of vaccination decreased.  Biosecurity 570 
and movement controls are known to be important aspects of a control strategy during a FMD outbreak 571 
due to the potential risk of disease spread (Anderson, 2002; Cottral, 1969; Ellis-Iversen et al., 2011).  572 
Additionally, identifying the personnel requirements to achieve sufficient levels of biosecurity and 573 
movement controls is needed, as well as the impact on animal welfare.   574 
The estimates of the probability of indirect transmission and achievable movement controls are 575 
uncertain parameters, based solely on USDA subject matter expert opinion.  Model outputs are quite 576 
sensitive to these parameters and an improved knowledge of the efficacy of biosecurity practices and 577 
the ability to achieve movement controls to limit direct and indirect transmission are necessary for 578 
more focused planning of optimal control efforts.   579 
 The validity of results reported here are dependent on application of sufficient resources 580 
required to implement the controls. Depopulation has been a mainstay of FMDV control plans however 581 
the ability to depopulate large feedlots may be questionable (McReynolds et al 2014b), and further 582 
modeling may be necessary to assess alternatives.    583 
Finally, the results reported here do not account for the potential of a reservoir of FMDV 584 
infection in the wildlife population.  FMDV can infect deer and feral swine and establishment in these 585 
populations could substantially complicate eradication efforts (Ward et al., 2007).    586 
   587 
Conclusion 588 
 In this simulation study of an FMD outbreak in the central U.S., scenarios with large 589 
vaccination zones had shorter median outbreak durations and fewer numbers of herds destroyed.  590 
Increasing the vaccination capacity had a small impact on the outbreak and may not be feasible if 591 
vaccine production and delivery is limited.  In these scenarios, feedlots >3,000 head had the highest 592 
vaccination priority and even with larger vaccine capacity few other production types were vaccinated 593 
in some scenarios.  Outbreak size and number of herds depopulated were sensitive to biosecurity 594 
practices and movement controls and to a lesser extent indirect contact rates. The level of biosecurity 595 
required to achieve a given probability of indirect transmission and the ability to restrict indirect 596 
movement consistent with acceptable animal welfare is uncertain.  Vaccination was not beneficial 597 
compared to depopulation alone to control the outbreak when biosecurity and movement controls were 598 
increased.  A better understanding of the biosecurity changes necessary during an outbreak to attain 599 
these levels is needed.  The results of this study will provide information about the impacts of disease 600 
control protocols which may be useful in choosing the optimal control methods to meet the goal of 601 
rapid effective control and eradication.  The results and impact of the control methods however may not 602 
be applicable to other regions due to the variability of livestock production systems that are found in 603 
different regions in the U.S.  604 
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Table 1. Simulation population of the 8-state region in the central U.S. that was used in 
NAADSM with the number of animals and herds by production type. 
Production Type Animals Herds 
Cow-calf 9,698,630 86,655 
Feedlot-Large (≥3,000 head) 9,147,279      979 
Feedlot-Small (<3,000 head) 7,377,698 25,096 
Dairy 1,062,276     3,232 
Swine-Large (≥1,000 head) 9,227,569      1,071 
Swine-Small (<1,000 head)  663,465    6,463 
Beef-swine mix    520,283    5,159 
Sheep 1,716,028 22,965 
Total 39,413,228 151,620 
 
  
Table
Table 2. Description of vaccination strategy for 17 simulated scenarios of a potential foot and 
mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S.   
Scenario  
Large  
Feedlots  
Vaccination 
b
 
Vaccination  
Capacity 
c
 
Vaccination 
Trigger (herds) 
Size of  
Vaccination Zone 
(km) 
1
a 
- - - - 
2  Priority 5,10 10 10 
3 Only 1,3 10 10 
4 Priority 5,10 10 50 
5 Only 1,3 10 50 
6 Priority 50,80 100 10 
7 Only 8,15 100 10 
8 Priority 50,80 100 50 
9 Only 8,15 100 50 
10 Priority 5,10 100 10 
11 Only 1,3 100 10 
12 Priority 5,10 100 50 
13 Only 1,3 100 50 
14 Priority 50,80 10 10 
15 Only 8,15 10 10 
16 Priority 50,80 10 50 
17 Only 8,15 10 50 
a 
Scenario 1 baseline depopulation without vaccination 
b  
Priority – from highest to lowest: large feedlot (≥3,000 head), small feedlot (<3,000 head), 
large swine (≥1,000 head), small swine (<1,000 head), beef-swine, dairy, cow-calf, and small 
ruminant.  
Only – Large feedlots only vaccinated.  
c  
The capacity for vaccination protocols in number of herds per day by 22 days after disease 
detection and by 40 days after disease detection  
 
  
Table 3. Median duration of outbreak, number of herds depopulated, number of animals 
depopulated, number of herds vaccinated, and number of animals vaccinated for each scenario 
(10
th 
- 90
th
 percentiles) [rank most to least optimal] of a potential foot and mouth disease virus 
outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
Scenario  
Outbreak  
Duration 
(days) 
Number of 
Herds 
Depopulated 
Number of 
Animals 
Depopulated 
(1000) 
Number of 
Herds 
Vaccinated 
Number of 
Animals 
Vaccinated  
(1000) 
1 
527
 f
  
(87-621) 
[10] 
6,890
 h
 
(32-8,101) [17]
 
 
13,663 
(196-17,611) 
 
 
 
2  
608
 i
 
(102-767) 
[17]
 
 
2,227
 g
 
(42-2,449) [13]
 
 
9,921 
(222-10,600) 
 
5,709
 i
 
(657-7304) 
[12]
 
 
7,644 
(0-8,500) 
3 
530
 fg
 
(48-687) 
[11]
 
 
2,248
 g
 
(10-3,156) [11]
 
 
9,939 
(72-11,500) 
472
 b
 
(0-514) [3]
 
 
4,319 
(0-4,764) 
4 
223
 b
 
(86-310) 
[3]
 
 
416
 b
 
(31-879) [2]
 
 
1,736 
(238-3,214) 
1,876
 g
 
(494-2,736) 
[10]
 
 
16,400 
(1,490-
23,640) 5 
389
 e
 
(286-559) 
[8]
 
 
1,735
 e
 
(1,326-2,063) 
[7]
 
 
7,508 
(5,774-8,591) 
1,043
 e
 
(725-1,460) [6]
 
 
10,300 
(7,000-
14,800) 6 
459
 fg
 
(45-721) 
[9]
 
 
1,991
 f
 
(9-2,301) [9] 
9,098 
(65-10,000) 
30,594
 k
 
(0-51,136) [15]
 
 
19,600 
(0-23,832) 
7 
550
 ghi
 
(64-753) 
[15] 
2,249
 g
 
(15-5,133) [15]
 
 
10,000 
(81-12,500) 
458
 b
 
(0-488) [2]  
4,183 
(0-4,600) 
8 
202
 ab
 
(131-390) 
[2]
 
 
440
 b
 
(233-616) [3]
 
 
1,863 
(1,071-2,395) 
10,000
 j
 
(6,400-24,560) 
[13]
 
 
14,900 
(10,000-
25,800) 9 
342
 d
 
(256-528) 
[6] 
1,605
 d
 
(1,242-3,712) 
[6]
 
 
6,950 
(5,600-10,400) 
1,044
 e
 
(784-1,398) [7]
 
 
10,400 
(7,400-
14,200) 10 
596
 hi
 
(154-800) 
[16]
 
 
2,203
 g
 
(49-3,270) [12] 
9,968 
(341-11,121) 
5,165
 h
 
(0-7,030) [11]
 
 
7,132 
(0-8,330) 
11 
540
 fgh
 
(90-709) 
[12]
 
 
2,276
 g
 
(32-7,318) [16]
 
 
10,000 
(268-15,000) 
425
 a
 
(0-463) [1] 
 
3,851 
(0-4,263) 
12 
250
 c
 
(146-318) 
[4]
 
 
855
 c
 
(234-1,150) [5]
 
 
3,702 
(968-4,727) 
1,800
 g
 
(635-2,420) [9]
 
 
17,200 
(6,250-
22,600) 13 
369
 de
 
(244-579) 
[7] 
1,848
 f
 
(1,320-7,904) 
[10]
 
 
8,008 
(6,275-16,360) 
859
 d
 
(528-1,098) [5]
 
 
8,461 
(4,833-11,000) 
14 
527
 fghi
 
(77-791) 
[13]
 
 
1,925
 f
 
(22-2,174) [8]
 
 
9,098 
(141-10,000) 
37,928
 l
 
(746-59,380) 
[16]
 
 
21,600 
(205-25,800) 
15 
545
 fgh
 
(363-706) 
[14]
 
 
2,238
 g
 
(1,681-2,648) 
[14]
 
 
9,922 
(8,017-10,675) 
499
 c
 
(432-525) [4]  
4,561 
(3,850-4,860) 
16 
181
 a
 
(123-366) 
[1]
 
 
252
 a
 
(107-427) [1]
 
 
1,028 
(515-1,644) 
11,902
 j
 
(6,923-26,654) 
[14]
 
 
15,500 
(10,000-
23,200) 17 
241
 bc
 
(133-568) 
[5]
 
 
440
 b
 
(87-850) [4]
 
 
1,754 
(521-3,373) 
1,329
 f
 
(528-2,718) [8]  
13,100 
(5,000-
26,310) 
Values within columns with different superscripts are different p<0.05 (adjusted p-value 
accounting for multiple comparisons) 
  
Table 4. The top 5 rankings of the scenarios with the lowest number of herds depopulated and 
shortest outbreak duration of a potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region 
of the U.S.  Rankings based on a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance.   
Sensitivity Analysis 
Parameter 
Lowest number of herds 
depopulated 
Shortest outbreak duration 
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Baseline Scenarios  16 4 8 17 12 16 4 8 12 17 
Indirect Transmission 15% 17 16 4 10 6 17 16 4 8 10 
Indirect Transmission 25% 16 8 4 17 1 4 1 11 16 3 
Indirect Movement 
Control 40% of baseline 
16 8 1 4 17 1 17 11 4 3 
Indirect Movement 
Control 20% of baseline 
16 4 17 8 1 16 4 17 8 7 
Indirect Contact Rate -
20% 
16 4 17 8 12 16 4 17 8 12 
Indirect Contact Rate 
+20% 
16 8 4 17 1 4 16 7 1 11 
 
  
Appendix 1. Disease state and spread parameters 
Table A1.  Calculated mean daily direct contact rates per herd used to parameterize the 
NAADSM model based on livestock contact survey results in Colorado and Kansas. 
Source  
Production Type 
Destination  
Production Type 
Mean Number of 
Contacts per Day 
per Herd 
Movement  
distance in km 
Cow/Calf Cow/Calf 0.027 Exponential (116.88) 
Cow/Calf Large Feedlot 0.002 Weibull (1.35,344.40) 
Cow/Calf Small Feedlot 0.002 Weibull (1.35,344.40) 
Cow/Calf Beef/Swine 0.027 BetaPERT (1.60,80.50,241.40) 
Dairy Dairy 0.065 Pearson 5 (1.01,7.73) 
Large Feedlot Large Feedlot 0.005 Gamma (6.87,71.25) 
Large Swine Large Swine 0.186 LogLogistic (1.10,66.10,1.24) 
Small Feedlot Large Feedlot 0.019 Weibull (1.46,547.06) 
Small Feedlot Small Feedlot 0.017 Beta (8.04,33.76,0.00,2643.80) 
Small Swine Small Swine 0.013 BetaPERT (0,20,181) 
Small Swine Beef/Swine 0.013 Lognormal (166.74,748.64) 
Beef/Swine Cow/Calf 0.027 Exponential (116.68) 
Beef/Swine Large Feedlot 0.003 Weibull (1.35,344.40) 
Beef/Swine Small Feedlot 0.003 Weibull (1.35,344.40) 
Beef/Swine Beef/Swine 0.026 Lognormal (166.74,748.64) 
Beef/Swine Small Swine 0.013 Lognormal (166.74,748.64) 
Small Ruminant Small Ruminant 0.024 Exponential (116.88) 
a
All combinations that are not listed above had a mean daily contact rate of 0. 
b
Beta distribution is a continuous distribution defined by four parameters: α1, α2, a minimum 
value, and a maximum value. 
 
 Table A2. Calculated mean daily indirect contact rate (per herd per day) by production type used 
to parameterize the NAADSM model based on livestock contact survey results in Colorado and 
Kansas. 
 FROM        
TO Cow/Calf 
Small 
Feedlot 
Large 
Feedlot 
Dairy 
Small 
Swine 
Large 
Swine 
Small 
Ruminant 
Beef/Swine 
Cow/Calf 0.133 0.090 0.123 0.181 0.005 0.026 0.018 0.009 
Small Feedlot 0.141 0.095 0.131 0.191 0.005 0.028 0.019 0.009 
Large Feedlot 1.711 1.155 1.589 2.326 0.063 0.337 0.229 0.114 
Dairy 0.623 0.420 0.578 1.045 0.026 0.136 0.093 0.041 
Small Swine 0.020 0.014 0.019 0.030 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.003 
Large Swine 0.044 0.030 0.041 0.066 0.015 0.086 0.015 0.013 
Small  
Ruminant 
0.052 0.035 0.048 0.078 0.002 0.008 0.070 0.001 
Beef/Swine 0.092 0.062 0.086 0.125 0.007 0.033 0.012 0.006 
 
  
Table A3. Distance distributions of indirect contacts 
Production type of 
movement source 
Movement distance in km for 
indirect contacts  
Cow/calf  Beta (8.39,18.78,0.00,887.39) 
Dairy  Beta (7.41,8.86,0.00,1580.40) 
Large feedlots Gamma (6.87,71.25) 
Small feedlots Beta (8.04,13.76,0.00,2463.80) 
Large swine Beta (4.55,4.35,0.00,1143.80) 
Small swine  Beta (4.42,4.19,0.00,1167.00) 
Beef/swine Beta (5.48,14.55,0.00,791.36) 
Small ruminants Beta (5.21,4.26,0.00,332.66) 
aBeta distribution is a continuous distribution defined by four parameters: α1, α2, a minimum 
value, and a maximum value. 
 
  
Table A4. Defining the duration of the disease state periods in days by production type
a
 
Production 
type 
Duration of the latent 
period  
Duration of the 
subclinical, infectious 
period 
Duration of the clinical, 
infectious period 
Duration of the 
immune period  
Cow/calf  Neg. binomial (12,0.77) Poisson (1.77) Gamma (35.94,0.65) Gaussian (1095, 180) 
Dairy  Neg. binomial (20,0.85) Poisson (1.74) Gamma (26.72,1.03) Gaussian (1095, 180) 
Large feedlots Neg. binomial (26,0.87) Binomial (9,0.19) Gamma (170.51,0.23) Gaussian (1095, 180) 
Small feedlots Neg. binomial (16,0.82) Poisson (1.70) Gamma (48.01,0.58) Gaussian (1095, 180) 
Large swine Neg. biniomial (4, 0.58) Poisson (2.05) Gamma (81.90,0.49) Weibull  (5, 985) 
Small swine 
and 
beef/swine 
Neg. biniomial (4, 0.56) Poisson (2.10) Gamma (12.78,1.66) Weibull  (5, 985) 
Small 
ruminants 
Neg. biniomial (14, 0.74) Neg. binomial (14,0.85) Gamma (15.78,1.22) Gaussian (930, 90) 
a
 from Mardones et. al., 2010 see text for details.  
 
 
Figure 1. An 8-state outlined region of central U.S. selected for modeling the potential of a foot 
and mouth disease outbreak initiated in a large feedlot in Northeast Colorado. 
 
 
 
Figure
 Figure 2. Median number of new herds detected as clinically infected by week of a potential foot 
and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
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 Figure 3. The total number of animals vaccinated each week by scenario number of a potential 
foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
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 Figure 4. Box plots of the duration of the active disease phase for the sensitivity analysis of the 
probability of transmission given indirect contact is at 15%, 20%, and 25% for all scenarios of a 
potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
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The box plot parameters are boxes at 25
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 percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5
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 percentiles and dots are outliers.  
 Figure 5. Box plots of the number of herds depopulated for the sensitivity analysis of the 
probability of transmission given indirect contact at 15%, 20%, and 25% for all scenarios of a 
potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S.   
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The box plot parameters are boxes at 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5
th
 and 
95
th
 percentiles and dots are outliers.  
 
 Figure 6. Box plots of the number of vaccinated herds for the sensitivity analysis of the 
probability of transmission given indirect contact is at 15%, 20%, and 25% for all scenarios of a 
potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
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The box plot parameters are boxes at 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5
th
 and 
95
th
 percentiles and dots are outliers.  
 
 Figure 7. Box plots of the duration of the active disease phase for the sensitivity analysis of the 
movement controls at 20%, 30%, and 40% of pre-outbreak levels for all scenarios of a potential 
foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S.   
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The box plot parameters are boxes at 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5
th
 and 
95
th
 percentiles and dots are outliers.  
 
 Figure 8. Box plots of number of herds depopulated for the sensitivity analysis of the movement 
controls at 20%, 30%, and 40% of pre-outbreak levels for all scenarios of a potential foot and 
mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S.   
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The box plot parameters are boxes at 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5
th
 and 
95
th
 percentiles and dots are outliers.  
 
 Figure 9. Box plots of number of herds vaccinated for the sensitivity analysis of the indirect 
movement controls at 20%, 30%, and 40% of pre-outbreak levels for all scenarios of a potential 
foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S.   
0
5
0
,0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011121314151617 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011121314151617 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011121314151617
20% of pre-outbreak level 30% of pre-outbreak levels 40% of pre-outbreak levels
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
h
e
rd
s
 v
a
c
c
in
a
te
d
Scenario #
 
a
The box plot parameters are boxes at 25
th
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th
 percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5
th
 and 
95
th
 percentiles and dots are outliers.  
 
 Figure 10. Box plots of the duration of the active disease phase for the sensitivity analysis of the 
indirect contact rate and the baseline indirect contact rate for all scenarios of a potential foot and 
mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
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The box plot parameters are boxes at 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5
th
 and 
95
th
 percentiles and dots are outliers.  
 
 Figure 11. Box plots of the number of herds depopulated for the sensitivity analysis of the 
indirect contact rate and the baseline indirect contact rate for all scenarios of a potential foot and 
mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
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a
The box plot parameters are boxes at 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5
th
 and 
95
th percentiles and dots are outliers. 
 
 Figure 12. Box plots of the number of herds vaccinated for the sensitivity analysis of the indirect 
contact rate and the baseline indirect contact rate for all scenarios of a potential foot and mouth 
disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
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